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ABSTRACT
The hierarchical interplay between ecology and genealogy is a fundamental ingredient for the 
most compelling current explanations in evolutionary biology. Yet philosophy of biology has 
hardly welcomed a classic fundamental intuition by palaeontologist Niles Eldredge, i.e. the 
non-coincidence and interrelation between ecology and genealogy, and their interaction in a 
Sloshing Bucket fashion. Hierarchy Theory and the Sloshing Bucket need to be made precise, 
developed	and	updated	in	light	of	an	explosion	of	new	discoveries	and	fields	and	philosophical	
issues. They also suggests re-thinking concepts such as natural selection, species, and speciation 
that have always been part of evolutionary theory.
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RESUMEN
La interacción jerárquica entre ecología y genealogía es un ingrediente fundamental de las más 
convincentes	explicaciones	de	la	biología	evolucionista	en	la	actualidad.	Sin	embargo,	la	filosofía	
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de la biología apenas ha acogido una intuición fundamental y clásica debida al paleontólogo 
Niles Eldredge, a saber: la no-coincidencia e interrelación entre la ecología y la genealogía, y 
su interacción a modo de cubeta rebosante. La Teoría de la Jerarquía y la de la Cubeta Rebo-
sante necesitan mayor precisión, así como un ulterior desarrollo y acutalización a la luz de la 
explosión	de	nuevos	descubrimientos	y	campos	y	de	cuestiones	filosóficas.	Siguieren	asimismo	
la necesidad de repensar conceptos tales como selección natural, especie y especiación, que 
han formado siempre parte de la teoría evolucionista.
PALABRAS CLAVE
EVOLUCIÓN, ECOLOGÍA, TEORÍA DE LA JERARQUÍA, CUBETA REBOSANTE, 
HOMO SAPIENS
I. bIogeography and ecology In eVolutIonary explanatIon:
the case of homo sapIens
the most recent models of human eVolutIon (Pievani 2012) operate a 
massive integration among all the clues coming from palaeontology, archaeo-
logy, molecular biology, and neuroscience. They propose new solutions to some 
long-standing mysteries of human evolution, such as the so-called Palaeolithic 
Revolution (80-60Kya), but they also carry a methodological lesson: it is impos-
sible to solve the mysteries of evolution without geographical reference and an 
intergenealogical look. That is to say: part of the sources of our incapacity of 
proposing plausible evolutionary hypotheses reside in an evolutionary thinking 
which is eradicated from geographical dimensions and ecological complexity.
I.1. fIrst bIrth: homo sapIens and Its specIatIonaL context
The speciational context of the birth of our species (200-80 Kya) has been 
pretty	clear	for	many	decades	now.	The	first	Homo sapiens made their appea-
rance in a context of evolutionary experimentation triggered by climate change 
and local ecological conditions: in sub-Saharan Africa during the upteenth dry 
phase which coincided with the last Quaternary Ice Age. This phase is charac-
terized, all through the hominid clade, by anatomic innovation, mainly by a 
neotenic trend, i.e., different modulation of gene expression regulating extended 
growth and developmental phases, contextual with the appearance of a new 
neural	substrate,	with	apparent	influences	on	social	organization	and	commu-
nication, and episodic expressions of symbolic behavior. Homo sapiens was a 
small population with many shared traits in this context, and some identifying 
traits such as a tall and slim build, large skull and cranial capacity (1400cc), 
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good stone working skills and a longer development than those found in any 
other Homo (Bruner, Manzi & Arsuaga 2003).1
But Homo sapiens was born a second time, i.e. with the beginning of cog-
nitively modern humans, 80 to 60 Kya. This phase has always been described 
as the Palaeolithic Revolution or the «great leap forward», emphasizing the 
sudden and unprecedented appearance, throughout the areas of distribution of 
Homo sapiens, of all the evidence arguably related to cognitive modernity.2 In 
fact, in the last decades very important pieces of evidence were accumulated. 
75Ky, is the age of engravings and decorations found in South Africa, while 
new and extremely innovative behaviors in European Cro-Magnons, are much 
younger. Indeed it seems that we have a first «burst» of innovation in South 
Africa. Some studies even seem to support a degree of anatomical innovation 
in this same spatiotemporal context. Lieberman & MCarthy (2007) found a 
meaningful difference in speech physiology between the vocal tract of an early 
sapiens specimen (100Kya) from Israel, associated with Middle Palaeolithic 
stone tools, and the vocal tract of eight Homo sapiens specimens from the Upper 
Palaeolithic (40-10Kya), associated with more complex stone tools. Articulated 
language requires pre-linguistic competences concerning social learning and 
tool production (Lieberman 2006), but also a typical right angled vocal tract, 
i.e. an elongated vertical section (larynx, vocal cords, pharynx) as long as the 
horizontal section (palate to lips).3 Studies like Lieberman & McCarthy (cit.), 
if corroborated, would undermine the notion that modern humans did not 
change in their anatomy in the last 200Ky. At the same time, they would grant 
a crucial role to a slight change, in relation to Homo sapiens’s «the overall 
structure» (Lieberman, 2006) including ecological, behavioral, social, and 
demographic factors.4
1  Mitochondrial DNA data has been showing since 1987 that Homo sapiens differ-
entiated in sub-Saharan Africa from the more ancient populations (Cavalli Sforza, Menozzi & 
Piazza 1994), possibly Homo heidelbergensis in the African version. Confirmation came from 
paleontological and archaeological data too.
2  One means of coping with this abruptness was the «exaptive hypothesis» about the 
emergence of cognitively modern humans: their cognition would imply a cascade functional 
reorganization with no anatomical innovation, triggered by a cultural innovation, probably 
language (Tattersall 1999). Sometimes the exaptive hypothesis has been considered saltationist 
and unexplanatory (e.g. Dennett 1995); on the other hand, some scholars thought that the great 
leap forward was an artifact of the lack of palaeontological and archeological evidence for that 
period (McBrearty & Brooks 2000, Henshilwood & Marean 2003).
3  Lack of this feature implies that Homo neanderthalensis, although possibly endowed 
with some morphological and genetic preconditions (hyoid bone and FOXP2 gene sequence), 
may have had only a basic or partial form of verbal language.
4  This would be an improved specification of the exaptive hypothesis which doesn’s 
exclude (indeed, requires) natural selection and further change after the inception of a new func-
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I.2. the bIogeographIcaL cradLe of a southafrIcan fInaL WaVe
There is more evidence now, but the increased resolution geographical, not 
only	temporal	(allowing	for	a	finer	reconstruction	of	evolutionary	stages).	And	
the models of human evolution tell that geography could be the keystone for 
the interpretation of the fragmentary data about human evolution. Geography 
and genealogy are strictly related, and the inherited information bears traces of 
what happened in the geographical and ecological spaces of the past, although 
it	is	very	difficult	to	find	reliable	causal	connections	between	climatic	changes,	
demographic	fluctuations,	and	clues	laid	down	in	genetic	diversity.	The	excep-
tionally low level of genetic diversity in our species –lowest than in any other 
primate (Kaessmann et al. 2001; Huff et al. 2010)– could be related to one or 
more population bottlenecks, i.e. drastic reductions in population numbers, 
we	went	through	in	our	evolution.	But	how	many,	and	when?	Molecular	data	
show a possible fall in Homo sapiens numbers around 70-75Kya, just in coin-
cidence with a drop in global temperatures due to a «volcanic winter» caused 
by the catastrophic eruption of Toba on the Isle of Sumatra (Gathorne-Hardy 
& Harcourt-Smith 2003). Alternative hypotheses see a bottleneck 190-123Kya 
related to increased aridity in Africa, due in turn to changes in winds and rain-
fall. This hypothesis is interesting for what concerns South Africa, where the 
few Homo sapiens may have found coastal refuges in the Cape, leaving some 
archaeological evidence we are collecting today (Marean et al. 2007). A third 
bottleneck hypothesis emphasizes the multiple waves of emigration of Homo 
sapiens out of Africa: although our species left the African continent many 
times (the major three being 120-100Kya, 85-80Kya, and 60-50Kya) we would 
all be descendents of a Final Wave, which should have undergone a series of 
founder effects through its global diffusion (Deshpande et al. 2009). The genetic 
variance of any today’s human population seems indeed inversely proportional 
to its distance from Africa (Ramachandran et al. 2005). The Final Wave would 
have been preceded by a phase of demographic expansion of the group to go: 
all mt-DNA lineages found today outside Africa descend from an African ha-
plogroup called L3, and the youngest major African L3 haplogroup corresponds 
to an increase in population size 86-61Kya (Jacobs & Roberts 2009). The Final 
Wave, 60-50 Kya, is thus a further stage of this biogeographical story, where 
climate instability triggers demographic expansions and contractions, punctua-
ted	bursts	of	cultural	innovation	in	Africa,	and	first	waves	of	emigration	out	of	
Africa. This stage is the one where cognitively modern humans rapidly spread 
in Eurasia and then Australia and Americas, they perform broad hunting and 
tion (Pievani & Serrelli 2011).
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probably cause the extinction of mega-fauna and demographic substitution of 
all the other human species or forms.
I.3. the fInaL WaVe In actIon:
causes and consequences of geographIcaL expansIon
But recent hypotheses bring ecogeography farther to the heart of the inno-
vation that made the Homo sapiens of the Final Wave what they were. Jacobs 
et al. (2008) believe that local, African environmental changes (not the ones 
like Toba or draught listed before) produced repeated pulses of demographic 
expansions	and	contractions,	influencing	social	networks	and	cultural	innovation	
capacities in small groups of Homo sapiens during the Middle Stone Age in 
southern Africa. Symbolic behavior could have originated in such a complex 
scenario of evanescent cultures associated with little hunter-gatherer populations. 
In this context of puctuated and ephemeral innovations these researchers frame 
the two cultures of Still Bay (71-70Kya) and Howieson’s Poort Points (65-60Kya), 
which were anomalies in the previous «great leap forward» story, but which are 
exactly included in the time span of the expansion of the L3 haplogroup (Jacobs 
& Roberts 2009). The alternation between phases of breakdown of social and 
economical networks and phases of demographic expansion and reconnection 
(with short-lived expansions out of Africa) would have been a crucial element 
of a constructive evolutionary loop between Homo sapiens and its environment. 
Another crucial element is bio-cultural innovation. An old and still valid idea 
(Atkinson, Gray & Drummond 2009) is that cultural innovation and behavioral 
complexity may translate into group competitive advantage by allowing for group 
cohesion,	coordination,	and	efficiency.	Language	could	have	been	a	further	«se-
cret weapon» for the band that eventually performed the Final Wave –a story, 
according to Atkinson (2011), supported by the loss of phonemic diversity in 
languages proportional to the distance from Africa. But even here, researchers 
do not see monodirectional, linear causality from bio-cultural innovation to 
demographic expansion. Since small populations are notoriously a locus of 
evolutionary innovation, fragmentation could have allowed for the emergence 
of a group with bio-cultural characteristics, allowing in turn for geographical 
expansion. But, researchers say, population expansion and geographical disper-
sion may themselves have fed back into more innovations, including the Still 
Bay and Howieson’s Poort Points (Jacobson & Roberts 2009).
I.4. humans and theIr ecoLogIcaL contexts after agrIcuLture
Hominid bands, up to and including the by-now nearly-extinct hunter-
gathering bands (such as the San peoples of southern Africa), with their inte-
gration of ecological and reproductive functions, were still members of their 
local ecosystems –utterly dependent, for example, on the productivity of the 
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lands on which they lived, as well as their individual and collective skills of 
harvesting plant and animal resources (Eldredge 1995b, 2000). The First Agri-
cultural Revolution, ca. 10 Kya, was a major change in the human ecological 
condition: the invention of farming and animal husbandry effectively removed 
humans	for	the	first	time	from	depending	solely	upon	the	resources	afforded	
by their local ecosystems, and Homo sapiens	became	the	first	species	whose	
local populations did not have ecological niches –and indeed were living outside 
local ecosystems. But even agriculture didn’t change the fundamental double 
framework –ecological and evolutionary– which is necessary to understand 
the sequences of events in our history. All the most if we consider that farmer 
populations became biodiversity productors as well as annihilators.
II. hIerarchy theory and the sLoshIng bucket
The interplay between ecology and genealogy is a fundamental ingredient 
for many of the most convincing explanations of the history of life, including 
the most advanced models of human evolution. But how should the two dimen-
sions	be	integrated	in	a	coherent	framework?	It	is	well-known	that	ecology,	as	a	
scientific	field	with	its	own	models	and	theories,	has	grown	apart	separated	from	
evolution (Mikkelson 2007, Matthews et al. 2011). On the other hand, micro-
evolutionary	biology	tends	to	embed	a	simplified	account	of	the	environment,	
boiled down to selective pressures and other factors. Just think to the schemes 
that are currently referred to as «recipes» of natural selection (Godfrey-Smith 
2009):	Lewontin’s	classical	«variation-inheritance-fitness	differences»	(1970),	
the replicator-vehicle distinction (Hull 1980, Dawkins 1976) recently updated 
by Griesemer (2000), other formulations based on phenotype heritability (used, 
e.g.,	in	Okasha	2006)	or	more	articulated	concepts	involving	the	definition	of	
a Darwinian population (Godfrey-Smith, cit.). All these descriptions are intra-
genealogical and formalize the environment, if anything, as a bending factor 
to some organismal or population variables. Evolutionists concerned with ma-
croevolution are those who are more used to see the relationships between, on 
the one hand, palaeoenvironments and their dynamics, and, on the other hand, 
phylogenetic branching and evolutionary innovation. Among them, Niles El-
dredge proposed one of the most coherent frameworks to reveal the connection 
between ecologies and genealogies.5
II.1. bIg dIsruptIon, bIg change: the sLoshIng bucket modeL
A fundamental passage of Eldredge’s thinking concerns the recognition 
that events in the history of life have very different magnitudes. For Eldredge, 
5  See, e.g., Eldredge (1984, 1985, 1986, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2003).
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evidence from geology, palaeoecology, and palaentology supports a Sloshing 
Bucket model of evolutionary stability and change (Eldredge 2003): in the 
history of life, the magnitude of ecological perturbations match the extent of 
evolutionary change. Localized ecological disruptions often result in the re-
establishment	of	similar	local	ecosystems,	by	recruitment	of	conspecifics	that	
still live outside the affected area. On the grandest scale, global environmental 
disruption is coupled with the disappearance of larger-scale taxonomic entities, 
and,	over	periods	of	millions	of	years	(typically	5-10	My),	modified	species	derive	
from taxa that survived the extinction event. For Eldredge the most interesting 
situation is the intermediate one, where regional ecosystems are disturbed: the 
fossil record shows that most speciation events take place as a consequence of 
regional ecosystemic collapse and multiple extinctions of species across different 
lineages, and for Eldredge speciation is basically what brings about evolutionary 
genetic change in the history of life.
There are events of different magnitudes also in the human evolution model 
presented above. The dry phase in the last Quaternary Ice Age corresponds to an 
important period of evolutionary innovation all through the hominid clade, and 
very likely over other vertebrate clades represented in Africa. This genealogical 
transversality leads us to a fundamental decoupling: any biogeographical setting 
comprehends representatives of many lineages, therefore ecological events will 
impact all of them transversally; on the other hand, lineages of relatives are 
usually distributed through many different places and environments, hence we 
can rarely see them properly as parts of an ecosystem (a habit which is, ins-
tead,	very	widespread).	The	strong	habit	of	conflating	ecology	and	genealogy	
is	exemplified	by	the	fact	that	hierarchical	representations	like	the	following	
are accepted without a blink: organism–population–species–ecosystem– bios-
phere.6 Yet, putting species and ecological niches in the same hierarchy is a 
logical absurdity. As Eldredge stated clearly many times (e.g., 1995a), local 
populations occupy ecological niches, while species don’t: they are featured 
in many ecosystems within their distribution area. Even at the scale of local 
populations, ecological groups and reproducing groups (demes) often do not 
coincide. A local population can play a somehow unitary ecological role while 
being divided in non-mutually-breeding sub-groups. Ecology and genealogy are 
6  Indeed we find a similar grouping all over the place in the works of the founding 
fathers of modern evolutionary biology. Dobzhansky (1951), for example, wrote: «the ecological 
niche occupied by the species “lion” is relatively much closer to those occupied by tiger, puma, 
and leopard than to those occupied by wolf, coyote, and jackal. The feline adaptive peaks form 
a group different from the group of the canine ‘peaks’. But the feline, canine, ursine, musteline, 
and certain other groups of peaks form together the adaptive “range” of carnivores, which is 
separated by deep adaptive valleys from the “ranges” of rodents, bats, ungulates, primates, and 
others» (1937/1951, p. 10).
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non-coincident but interrelated. In human evolution, localized events such as 
African climate fluctuations may have caused iterated social and geographical 
fragmentation, with no speciation but with intraspecific modifications.7 These 
innovations may have brought about an exceptionally expansive migratory 
subpopulation, that began modifying its own genetic makeup by settling in new 
territories (founder effects, genetic gradients), also assisting to the extinction 
of its closest relatives in the reached territories.
II.2. tWo kInds of hIerarchIes:
ecoLogIcaL/economIc, and geneaLogIcaL/eVoLutIonary
The two «walls» of the Bucket are, for Eldredge, two hierarchies:8 the 
ecological hierarchy and the genealogical hierarchy, respectively.9 The core 
intuition running through the various scales of the Bucket is that organisms 
are part of at least two different kinds of systems: (1) matter-energy transfer 
systems, where organisms are parts of local populations that in turn are parts 
of nested ecosystems; (2) genetically-based information systems, where orga-
nisms are parts of local breeding populations that in turn are parts of species, 
which belong to historical lineages –genera, families, orders, etc.:
The clue to unravelling the evolutionary consequences of interactions 
[between ecosystems and species] derives from the observation that organisms 
seem	to	be	both	energy	conversion	machines	and	reproducing	‘packages’	of	
genetic information. As such they are integrated simultaneously into two largely 
separate, but interacting kinds of general systems (Eldredge 1986, p. 351).
Seen as matter-energy transfer systems, organisms are parts of «avatars» 
(Damuth 1985) that in turn are parts of local ecosystems. The economic roles 
played by such populations are what constitute ecological niches. Local ecosys-
tems are parts of regional systems, a geographic mosaic of matter-energy transfer 
systems that together constitute the global biosphere. Seen as genetically-based 
information systems, or as units making more of themselves, organisms are parts 
of «demes» up through the Linnaean Hierarchy. Eldredge stressed that, while 
evolutionary theory has legitimately focused most on genetic processes and the 
7  Including, for Lieberman and McCarthy (2007), also those involving the completion 
of articulated language.
8  Niles Eldredge (e.g., 1986) adopted Hierarchy Theory as an approach to understanding 
the evolutionary process. The birthdate of Hierarchy Theory can be located in the 1980s when, in 
the context of complexity theory, several scientists (e.g., Allen & Starr 1982) and thinkers (e.g., 
Salthe 1985) began exploring in detail the nature of hierarchical systems. Hierarchy Theory uses 
a relatively small set of principles to keep track of the complex structure and behavior of systems 
with multiple levels such as social systems, physical and biological structures, and biological 
taxonomies.
9  An interesting work on a similar distinction is Caponi (2012).
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formation of genetic lineages, evolution does not occur in a vacuum: rather, it 
is what takes place inside matter-energy transfer systems that determines, in 
large measure, the patterns of stability and change in genetic systems that we 
call «evolution».
The fact that global environmental disruption coincides with mass extinc-
tions (Raup & Sepkoski 1982, 1984, Eldredge 1991), i.e. the hardly selective 
disappearance of higher-rank taxonomic entities, can be evident also to non-
specialists of macroevolution. But, for Eldredge, at all scales the interplay of 
the economic and the genealogical hierarchies is a crucial way of framing the 
explanation of the patterns of biological systems and their histories. Ecological 
disruptions with different pulse, pace and scope have corresponding effects on 
matter-energy systems on different scales, and the Sloshing Bucket theory of 
evolution states very generally that evolutionary change is driven by ecological 
dynamics that have repercussions on the information stored in the genealogical 
hierarchies.	Eldredge’s	proposal	 is	 thus	a	flipover	of	 the	 traditional	primacy	
given to genealogy over ecology, although the genealogical hierarchy is active 
in offering the dynamics for conservation and innovation that enter in the ecolo-
gical arena. The innovative load of this thinking and, at the same time, its scarce 
penetration	in	common	thinking,	is	exemplified	by	the	standard	presentation	of	
core concepts like natural selection and speciation.
II.3. naturaL seLectIon and specIatIon In the sLoshIng bucket:
reInVentIng eVoLutIon
Natural selection is a telling example of how Hierarchy Theory can re-
formulate the most basic concepts of evolutionary theory. Natural selection 
is an ecological process, whose «raw recruit» is the intra-populational, inter-
individual variation of ecologically relevant traits provided by the working of 
the genealogical hierarchy. Although organisms are units that reproduce and, at 
the very same time, units that appear on the ecological stage, conceptualizing 
natural selection requires a distinction between the nested systems of inhe-
ritance (family, deme, species, genus etc.) and the nested ecological systems 
(the avatar with a local ecological role, the local multi-species ecosystem, and 
regional ecosystem, up to the biosphere). Standard accounts of natural selection 
instead translate ecological differences automatically into units of reproductive 
success,	thus	conflating	the	processes	that	Eldredge’s	framework	wants	to	di-
sentangle. Thousands of examples would illustrate such an opacization of both 
the phylogenetic context and the ecological rhythms and dynamics. One for all: 
D.S. Wilson’s (2010) argument that in human evolution projectile throwing was 
converted into social surveillance, allowing for the suppression of intra-group 
selection in favor of inter-group selection, and yielding an evolutionary major 
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transition.10 Reconstructions like Wilson’s try and stand without reference to the 
multispecies and fluctuating context we presented above, as if internal variation 
and an absolute measure of fitness could be able to account for evolutionary 
change. Reflecting on the actual interaction between ecology and genealogy 
is the challenge cast by Eldredge and by the evolutionary scenarios that await 
for being explained, albeit more complex and conjectural.
Hierarchy Theory clashes also with traditional presentations of speciation 
that commonly depict one species at a time, and classify speciation events as 
allopatric or sympatric, and then for example peripatric or parapatric, therefore 
on a geographical basis (after Mayr 1942). In light of Hierarchy Theory, both 
these habits are wrong. First, by «geographic speciation», we mean not much an 
eco-geographical event, but rather one of the possible genealogical consequen-
ces of ecological barriers, i.e. the outcome of a multiplication of genealogical 
entities at the level of species within instances of the evolutionary hierarchy. 
As Gavrilets (2010) pointed out, a geographical taxonomy of speciation is silent 
about what, if anything, happens in the genealogical hierarchy, for example about 
the kinds of genetic, morphological or behavioral «uncoordination» that yield 
reproductive isolation. A new genealogical taxonomy of processes of diversi-
fication	is	possible.	Second,	geographic	barriers	impact	many species at once: 
ecological events which arguably trigger speciation are cross-phyletic. A proper 
re-description of geographic speciation should contextualize the phenomenon 
in the scenario of ecological systems (ecosystems and, at a macroevolutionary 
scale, faunas or biotas). Sometimes speciation can be adaptive,11 but the im-
portant thing is that adaptation –usually seen from an intra-populational point 
of view as well– should be described in the context of ecological reassortment 
and reshaping of communities.
II.4. phILosophIcaL Issues In hIerarchy theory
What	work	needs	to	be	done	on	Hierarchy	Theory?	Eldredge’s	series	of	
books and papers progressively developed and revised details such as the num-
ber of levels, acceptable entities, and processes, and this is a still much open 
enterprise.	On	the	other	hand,	the	work	demonstrated	the	robustness,	flexibility,	
and generality of the core intuition –the «unity in diversity» of the genealogical 
and the ecological dimensions– which is orthogonal and beyond the particular 
10  «The reason that we are so unique among primates is that our ancestors became the 
primate equivalent of a single organism or a social insect colony» (Wilson, cit.).
11  A critical assessment of the relative frequency of adaptive speciation and of other 
relative frequencies require methods to compare very different taxa that are distantly related. 
Many studies, from time to time, try to overcome these metodological obstacles in order to obtain 
these important estimates concerning evolution as a process.
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and contingent debates that have emerged in the last 30 years in evolutionary 
theory, such as:
The ontological status of levels in the hierarchies1. : do the two hierar-
chies	exist	as	«things	out	there»?	If	not,	they	are	an	epistemological	
device, in which case their ontology would be variable, for example 
the levels will have to be demarcated from time to time according to 
epistemological needs. Similar positions are brought forth for both 
the phylogenetic hierarchy (e.g., Ereshefsky 1997) and the ecological 
hierarchy (e.g., Potochnik & McGill in press).
The multiple species notions2. : here we used the biological concept 
of species (a level in the genealogical hierarchy), with no necessary 
link with the individuality thesis. But even so, the biological concept 
of species is not the only one (Coyne & Orr 2004, Wilkins 2011), 
and it doesn’t apply equally well to all life (O’Malley & Dupré 
2007, O’Malley 2010).
The requirements for individuality in evolution3. : are the entities 
found	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 each	 hierarchy	 individuals?	And	 in	
which	sense?	Despite	the	historical	role	of	Eldredge	and	colleagues	
in exploring the individuality thesis in evolution (e.g., Hull 1980, 
Gould 2002, Wilson & Barker 2013), mainly through the idea of 
species selection (see Jablonski 2008), there doesn’t seem to be 
a necessary commitment to the individuality thesis in Hierarchy 
Theory for any particular level.
The units and levels of selection4. : does selection happen among 
genes,	or	species,	or	other	units	beyond	the	organism?	Hierarchy	
Theory allows for the now well-studied phenomenon of multi-level 
selection (Keller 1999, Okasha 2006), but also for other processes 
that are peculiar to different magnitudes and levels of the two hie-
rarchies	as	Gould	articulated	finely	in	his	latest	work	(2002).
The tempo of evolution5. : the Sloshing Bucket theory is undeniably 
tied to a punctuated equilibria view of evolution (Eldredge & Gould 
1972, Gould & Eldredge 1977, Gould 2002). Eldredge often argues 
that nothing interesting happens in evolution (therefore, stasis) wi-
thout relevant disruptions in the ecosystems (punctuations). It is true 
as well that the Sloshing Bucket accomodates events of many scales, 
including natural selection in stable environments. The relative 
frequencies and incidences of happenings of different magnitudes 
remains partly open (Eldredge et al. 2005), and so does a complete 
account of their causal patterns.
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Emergence, upward and downward causation, and reductionism 6. 
among levels are philosophical debates touched by the Hierarchy 
view,	and	probably	necessary	for	clarifying	what	kind	of	scientific	
explanation is actually being proposed, and what are its ontological 
implications and requirements (see, for example, Craver & Bechtel 
2006, Johnson 2010, Okasha 2011, Baetu 2011).
The list could grow a lot, touching e.g. the implications of Hierarchy Theory 
for taxonomy and systematics, or for the balance between adaptive and non-
adaptive evolution. Many of these debates were heated in the 1980s and, not by 
chance, are still open today. Hierarchy Theory, albeit born in that culture ground, 
is not automatically committed to any position in every single debate. Rather, 
in many cases it can provide a framework for an answer. For example, it makes 
the question whether macroevolution is causally distinct from microevolution 
obsolete,	by	operating	an	irreversible	unification	confirmed	by	the	contents	of	
the	most	advanced	natural	histories	(first	of	all,	that	of	our	species)	and	by	their	
methods, integrating more and more precise palaeoclimatic, palaeogeographical 
intergenealogical data, molecular phylogeny and diversity studies. Adaptive and 
exaptive stories are reintegrated, but they are not any more confronted only with 
neontological	data,	recent	environments,	and	rarefied,	imagined,	delocalized,	
adimensional ecological contexts supporting just-so stories.
III. conclusIon
When philosophers, theorists, and working scientists think about evolution, 
they often do so by means of models based on inheritance. Natural selection, for 
example,	is	quantified	as	selective	pressures,	intended	as	coefficients	directly	
influencing	reproductive	outputs,	or	summaries	of	the	influences	on	reproduc-
tive outputs. Ecology therein is often seen as the circumstancy of evolution, a 
source	of	perturbations	and	influences	which	is	accurately	reflected,	translated	
into units of reproductive output. Yet contemporary explanatory models of 
biological evolution, for example those that are emerging for Homo sapiens, 
show that a much much better understanding of the constructive interaction 
between two independent domains –the ecological and the genealogical– is 
required not only to account for quintessentially macroevolutionary events such 
as mass extinctions, but also for smaller-scale happenings such as speciations 
and	 intra-specific	 evolutionary	 innovations.	The	 huge	 frequency	 of	 utterly	
inheritance-centric philosophical works on natural selection seems, in this light, 
an	unmistakable	symptom	of	theoretical	inertia.	Bucket	Thinking	could	reflect	
the way in which the best evolutionary explanations are built today, and at the 
same time aid the explanation by laying down and relating the researches that 
are	being	conducted	in	different	fields	(e.g.	from	population	genetics	to	palaeon-
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tology, from ecosystem ecology to developmental biology). Bucket Thinking is 
also a way of reframing many classical problems, such as multi-level selection, 
individuality, or even reductionism or emergence. This doesn’t mean that Hie-
rarchy and the Bucket are free of their own epistemological and methodological 
problems. On the contrary, what we suggest is precisely a critical philosophical 
discussion more deep than the one that has been deserved until now to these 
potentially fruitful ideas. Hierarchy Theory asks to be developed and updated 
in	 light	of	an	explosion	of	new	discoveries	and	fields,	e.g.,	EvoDevo,	 lateral	
gene transfer and the charge of zoo-centrism pending on evolutionary theory 
(O’Malley 2010), network theory, genomics. But the dual Hierarchy Theory is 
also a way of re-thinking and re-framing concepts that have ever been present 
in evolutionary theory, like natural selection itself, or species and speciation, 
as we have seen here.
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